As diplomats gathered in New York for the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Conference on April 27, Iran's nuclear program—the most intensively monitored by the International Atomic Energy Agency—stands as a case study in collapsing trust. Tehran has drawn a stark conclusion, Middle East Eye reported on May 4: years of compliance and intrusive inspections did not produce security, but instead culminated in sanctions, the assassination of its scientists, and direct military strikes on its facilities.
The IAEA now dedicates the highest portion of its entire budget to monitoring, verification, and oversight of Iran’s nuclear programme. More than any other state. Yet in the past two decades, successive IAEA reports and publicly available US intelligence assessments have not established conclusive evidence of an active nuclear weapons programme.
Since 2003, Tehran negotiated with major powers and ultimately signed the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action. It accepted significant nuclear restrictions. It remained in compliance.
Then the United States withdrew from the agreement. That rupture changed everything. Diplomatic efforts resumed in 2025 and 2026, including US-Iran talks and the Islamabad track.
Both reportedly achieved meaningful progress. But renewed military action involving the US and Israel, alongside intensified sanctions and economic blockades, ultimately overshadowed those negotiations. From Tehran’s perspective, five strategic lessons now shape its nuclear outlook.
The first is brutal in its simplicity: compliance does not guarantee security. Membership in the NPT and adherence to IAEA safeguards not only failed to provide security guarantees, but coincided with escalating vulnerabilities. Comprehensive sanctions.
Sustained cyber operations like the Stuxnet attack that damaged nuclear infrastructure. And ultimately, military strikes. At least 14 nuclear scientists are believed to be among those killed in Israel’s Operation Rising Lion, launched on June 13, 2025.
Prior to 2025, several other Iranian scientists were killed in assassinations spanning from 2010 to 2020. Mohsen Fakhrizadeh in 2020. Majid Shahriari in 2010.
Masoud Ali Mohammadi in 2010. The names accumulate. Second, transparency can increase strategic exposure.
Detailed disclosures and intrusive inspections reveal sensitive facilities and personnel. That information, Tehran believes, is then exploited in coercive actions—cyber operations, sabotage incidents, targeted killings, and military strikes against key nuclear infrastructure. Enrichment and heavy water facilities in Natanz, Isfahan, and Arak were hit during US and Israeli operations.
Third, the IAEA is perceived as politically influenced. Iranian officials increasingly view the agency not as a purely technical body, but as one shaped by geopolitical pressures, particularly from Western states. Senior bodies including Iran’s foreign ministry and Atomic Energy Organization publicly criticized the agency’s reporting as “politically motivated” and reflective of external influence.
Distrust of the IAEA inside Iran has grown steadily over two decades. In 2010, Iran’s Intelligence Minister Heidar Moslehi accused the IAEA of sending “spies working for foreign intelligence gathering organisations among its inspectors.” After the 2025 Israeli attacks, such suspicions intensified. Senior Iranian lawmaker Mahmoud Nabavian accused IAEA inspectors of espionage and alleged that surveillance microchips had been discovered concealed in inspectors’ shoes during security checks at nuclear sites.
Whether accurate or not, these accusations further eroded Iranian confidence. Calls in Tehran to restrict access to inspections grew louder. Fourth, verification processes facilitate coercive measures.
Safeguards reporting and resolutions are perceived as providing legal and political justification for sanctions, diplomatic isolation, and other forms of pressure. A few days after the 2025 Israeli-US strike on Iran, Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov accused the IAEA of providing “pretexts” that enabled Israel to justify its recent air strikes on Iranian nuclear sites. Fifth, US and Israeli primacy in shaping the Iranian nuclear dossier.
The trajectory of Iran’s nuclear negotiations since 2003 leaves little doubt that these two actors have played the primary and decisive role. The direction, pace, and outcomes have been driven largely by Washington and Tel Aviv. Multilateral institutions have occupied a secondary and largely ineffective position.
Bodies such as the UN Security Council and the IAEA appear in this context to have functioned primarily in reactive or procedural capacities. Their inability to adopt even minimal positions—such as issuing clear condemnations of assassinations of Iranian nuclear scientists or military strikes targeting nuclear facilities—has been interpreted as evidence of diminished effectiveness and constrained autonomy. This pattern raises critical questions.
Can the nonproliferation regime function as an impartial and authoritative framework in the face of major geopolitical conflicts? Viewed through this lens, the recurring review conferences of the NPT risk being perceived not as effective mechanisms of governance, but as largely procedural exercises that consume time and resources without delivering meaningful outcomes. The contrast with other states sharpens the grievance.
Other non-nuclear-weapon states continue to maintain advanced enrichment capabilities without facing demands for their elimination. Nuclear-armed states outside the NPT framework remain largely immune from comparable pressure. Most notably, Israel has remained the only nuclear-armed state in the Middle East while refusing to join the NPT.
It has effectively blocked implementation of long-standing UN resolutions calling for a Weapons of Mass Destruction Free Zone in the Middle East. Yet neither the IAEA, nor the UNSC, nor the major world powers have exerted meaningful pressure on Israel regarding its nuclear arsenal. The contrast with North Korea has further reinforced the perception that strategic deterrence—not treaty compliance—provides the ultimate guarantee of survival.
As a result, the foundational bargain of the NPT is increasingly being called into question. Taken together, these developments have severely undermined the credibility of the NPT, the IAEA, and the UNSC in the eyes of many states, particularly Iran. From Tehran’s perspective, years of compliance, intrusive inspections, and negotiated agreements did not produce security or normalisation.
They culminated in sanctions, coercion, sabotage, and ultimately military attack. Why It Matters: If states conclude that adherence to nonproliferation obligations neither protects their security nor ensures equal treatment under international law, then confidence in the entire nonproliferation regime will continue to erode. The Iranian case sends a signal to every non-nuclear state watching: the treaty’s grand bargain between nuclear restraint and security assurances is broken.
Restoring legitimacy will require far more than procedural reaffirmations at review conferences. - At least 14 nuclear scientists were killed in Israel's 2025 Operation Rising Lion, adding to a list of targeted killings dating back to 2010. - Israel remains the only nuclear-armed state in the Middle East outside the NPT, facing no meaningful pressure over its arsenal. What comes next is a test of institutional credibility. The NPT Review Conference runs through May 22.
Diplomats face a choice: address the widening gap between legal principles and geopolitical realities, or preside over another procedural exercise. For Tehran, the lesson is already learned. The policy says one thing.
The reality says another. Rebuilding trust demands closing that gap—with actions, not words.
Key Takeaways
— - Iran's nuclear program is the most heavily monitored by the IAEA, yet compliance brought sanctions, cyberattacks, and military strikes.
— - At least 14 Iranian nuclear scientists were killed in Israel's 2025 Operation Rising Lion, deepening Tehran's distrust of international oversight.
— - Israel remains the Middle East's only nuclear-armed state outside the NPT, facing no comparable pressure over its arsenal.
— - The NPT's credibility hinges on whether the current review conference can close the gap between legal principles and geopolitical realities.
Source: Middle East Eye
