The US-Israeli military campaign against Iran, launched on February 28, has failed to fracture the Islamic Republic's leadership. Instead, it has triggered a playbook refined during the 1980-88 Iran-Iraq war, a conflict that killed over a million people and ultimately entrenched the clerical regime. 'For a dictatorial regime, war is the best blessing because any dissenting voice can be silenced under its pretext,' said Iranian opposition figure Behrouz Farahani, describing a dynamic now repeating itself.
That dynamic is not accidental. It is a direct inheritance from a war that began in September 1980, when Saddam Hussein ordered a full-scale ground and air attack on Iran, expecting to reach Tehran within weeks. The war lasted nearly eight years.
It reshaped the Islamic Republic into the system it is today, Middle East Eye reported in a detailed analysis published May 3. At the time, Iran was reeling from the 1979 revolution that toppled the US-backed Shah. The army was disintegrating.
Nationalist, leftist, and moderate religious factions competed with ultraconservative clerics led by Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini. The invasion changed everything. Saddam's attack did not bring down Khomeini's rule.
It helped entrench it. The war allowed the new leadership to eliminate opposition groups, tighten its grip, and build enduring institutions. A quote attributed to Khomeini appeared on walls across Iranian cities: "War is a blessing."
Behrouz Farahani, a Paris-based Iranian opposition figure and critic of the current US-Israeli war, explained the logic to Middle East Eye. War provides cover for ruthlessness. Dissent becomes treason.
The foundations of totalitarianism strengthen. The Iran-Iraq war ended in 1988. Khomeini died a year later.
Reconstruction began under Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, Iran's second supreme leader. The graffiti quoting Khomeini faded. Khamenei's statements replaced them.
But the lessons drawn from that war have shaped every response to political and military tension since. Many figures dominating Iran's political and military landscape today rose through the ranks during the Iran-Iraq War. Qassem Soleimani, the slain Quds Force commander, was one.
His successor Esmail Qaani is another. Ali Larijani, a former senior security official assassinated by Israel on March 17, was part of that generation. So are the men now negotiating with the United States.
Parliament speaker Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf remained in the military for years after the war, later exchanging his uniform for civilian office. They are products of a specific crucible. One of the first lessons the Islamic Republic learned from the Iran-Iraq war was that it had few real options internationally.
The ideology that shaped Iran's political system after 1979 left the new rulers with very few allies. When the war began, western powers backed Saddam Hussein. Most Arab countries in the region, with the exception of Syria and, at times, Libya, sided against Iran.
Iraq's military quickly proved stronger. Iran lost parts of oil-rich Khuzestan province to invading forces. Despite isolation, internal chaos, and a struggle to secure weapons, Iran managed to push Iraqi forces back after about a year.
That dynamic of steadfastness when confronted by a stronger adversary has been played out again in this latest war. Maziar Behrooz, a prominent researcher of contemporary Iranian history and author of Iran at War: Interactions with the Modern World and the Struggle with Imperial Russia, told Middle East Eye that Iran's response to the US-Israeli assault reflects lessons from four decades ago. "While Iran was under attack by Iraq, they [the Iranian establishment] realised they were not going to receive any help from the outside, so they had to rely on themselves," he explained. The lesson was missile technology.
Iran reverse-engineered and improved it. Today's result is visible in Iran's drone and missile capabilities, which have inflicted substantial damage on those who have now attacked Iran. Behrooz highlighted another lesson: move key operations underground.
After 1988, Iran began building missile and drone facilities deep inside mountains. Parts of its nuclear programme went underground. This shift is one reason the US and Israel have failed to stop Iranian missiles from being launched at Israel and Gulf Arab states over recent weeks.
Self-reliance was not limited to the military. It became central to Iran's political approach. Before 1979, the country had been heavily dependent on western powers, especially the US, in both military and civilian sectors.
That fundamentally changed. "The establishment realised it had to be independent and rely as much as possible on its own resources," Jafari explained. "Reliance on their own initiatives and strategising their policies within this framework became of high importance for them in the military, industry, intelligence, and all other fields."
The war also defined how the new ruling establishment would deal with power at home. Behrooz pointed to the overlap between the US embassy hostage crisis and Saddam Hussein's invasion in 1980. The United States' reputation among the Iranian public was already low due to the CIA's involvement in the 1953 coup that removed the democratically elected prime minister and handed power back to the Shah.
When dozens of US diplomats and citizens were detained in the embassy in 1979, anti-American sentiment grew. Soon after, Saddam Hussein invaded. "And then you have a war on your hands," Behrooz said. "The regime used both issues to rally support for the cause and also to consolidate power."
This consolidation was driven by a widespread crackdown. After 1981, the establishment moved faster to eliminate its main rivals, beginning with the key opposition group, the People's Mojahedin Organisation. Pro-Khomeini factions forced out Abolhassan Banisadr, the country's first post-revolution president.
They carried out military operations against Kurdish organisations. They dismantled leftist and nationalist groups. These moves reshaped Iran's post-revolutionary society.
Many supported the new order. Others stepped back and waited. "There was substantial popular support for the regime, but there were also substantial bystanders: people who stepped back, watched what was going on, and waited to see who would win," Behrooz said. A similar dynamic is visible following the US-Israeli attacks on Iran.
The government used the war to stoke nationalist sentiment and partially repair its image with the public. That image had been badly damaged after the brutal suppression of nationwide anti-establishment protests in January. The war gave the ruling establishment an opportunity to tighten control.
Executions of imprisoned dissidents increased. Stricter laws on "espionage" and "contact with foreign media" were introduced. Arrests on these charges became more widespread.
When the war ended, many senior and mid-level IRGC commanders moved into politics, the economy, culture, and even sports management. Jafari told Middle East Eye that this shift had already begun during the conflict but accelerated after the fighting stopped. As military operations ended, state institution-building picked up speed.
The large number of people who had spent years on the battlefield were redirected into other sectors. Jafari described this process as driven by a form of "army brotherhood." He stressed the human aspect of the war. But because that war lasted very long, that brotherhood was really forged in steel."
When these fighters returned from the frontlines, the strong ties they had formed became a force behind the creation of new institutions and the expansion of the state's bureaucratic and administrative system. The effects of this deep institutionalisation have become clear in the latest war. The US and Israel expected that targeting Iran's political and military leadership would bring down the entire system.
The outcome was the opposite. Jafari called this miscalculation rooted in a "slavery orientalist idea that these Iranians are kind of savages who cannot organise any modern state." He added: "This system is very organised, with layers of offices, a finance system, and planning for its own survival."
The policy says one thing. The reality says another. If the Iran-Iraq war taught the Islamic Republic how to survive external threats, it did not resolve its internal tensions.
Public dissatisfaction with Khomeini and his followers existed even during the Iran-Iraq war. At that time, the establishment had broader support and faced fewer limits in suppressing dissent. Today, that balance has shifted.
The circle of power has narrowed. The distance between the state and society has increased. Behrooz explained: "In any country, when you do not take care of your citizens, they will be unhappy with you.
In democratic countries, they vote you out. In undemocratic countries, the ability to listen to the base diminishes over time, and as repression intensifies, understanding what the base demands becomes increasingly impossible."
The lesson the Islamic Republic did not learn is that repression alone cannot resolve dissatisfaction. It deepens it over time. Jafari put it more directly: "Because of the ideological, political and cultural restrictions, many citizens do not feel that they can be integrated in this system.
Moreover, we have economic problems, poverty, mismanagement, and corruption, and that's why the majority are fed up with the system."
Why It Matters: The current war is not just a military confrontation. It is a mechanism of state consolidation. The Iranian leadership's playbook, forged in the 1980s, converts external threat into internal control.
Understanding this pattern is essential for any assessment of the conflict's trajectory. The war will not simply end with a ceasefire. It will leave behind a more entrenched, more militarized, and more repressive state apparatus, regardless of the outcome on the battlefield.
For ordinary Iranians, this means the window for political reform narrows further. For the US and Israel, it means that decapitation strikes and bombing campaigns are unlikely to achieve regime change. The system was built to absorb exactly this kind of shock. - The Islamic Republic's response to the US-Israeli assault is a direct application of lessons from the 1980-88 Iran-Iraq war, which taught the regime that external threat can be used to crush internal dissent and consolidate power. - Iran's military self-reliance, including its underground missile and drone facilities, was a direct result of the isolation and arms shortages it experienced during the Iran-Iraq war. - The current leadership, from the foreign minister to the parliament speaker, is a generation shaped by the Iran-Iraq war, and their "army brotherhood" has been the foundation of the state's institutional expansion. - While war strengthens the regime's grip, it does not resolve the deep-seated public dissatisfaction driven by economic mismanagement, corruption, and political repression, creating a more volatile long-term situation.
What comes next is a more fortified, more repressive Iran. The immediate military conflict will eventually de-escalate or settle into a protracted standoff. But the internal consolidation will accelerate.
Expect further restrictions on civil society, more executions of political prisoners, and a deeper entrenchment of the IRGC in all sectors of the economy. The negotiating team in any future talks will be led by men who view diplomacy as another front in a permanent war for survival. The real story will not be in the missile strikes, but in the prisons, the parliament, and the streets of Tehran, where the distance between the state and its people grows by the day.
Key Takeaways
— Iran's current war strategy is a direct application of lessons from the 1980-88 Iran-Iraq war, which taught the regime to use external threats to crush internal dissent.
— Military self-reliance, including underground missile and drone facilities, was born from the isolation and arms shortages of the Iran-Iraq war.
— The current leadership is a generation shaped by that war, and their 'army brotherhood' has been the foundation of the state's institutional expansion.
— While war strengthens the regime's grip, it does not resolve deep-seated public dissatisfaction driven by economic mismanagement and political repression.
Source: Middle East Eye
