The Trump administration has lifted Treasury Department sanctions on at least 145 individuals and companies since taking office, a pace that far outstrips the roughly 200 comparable delistings during the entire four-year Biden term, according to a new tracker from Human Rights First. The removals, many made with little or no public explanation, have targeted actors sanctioned for corruption, human rights abuses, and ties to Russia's war machine. "Taken together, they form a growing pattern that gives cause for alarm about whose interest these policy changes are serving," wrote Adam Keith and Amanda Strayer of Human Rights First in a Just Security analysis published Monday.
The tracker, maintained by Human Rights First and detailed in Just Security, found that the delistings cover a wide range of programs, from the flagship Global Magnitsky anti-corruption sanctions to measures targeting Myanmar's military junta and Russian-linked financial networks. The Treasury actions alone are on pace to quadruple the Biden administration's annual rate. Many of the removals happened through opaque administrative processes.
The Treasury Department often notes a delisting only in a longer, technical press release about unrelated actions. In multiple cases, the administration declined to explain why a sanctioned person or company was removed. "The opaqueness of the sanctions delisting process is not unique to Trump," Keith and Strayer wrote. But the volume and the targets are new.
One Lebanese businessman sanctioned in 2021 for "personally profiting from…pervasive corruption" was delisted in February. No explanation was given. A Dominican sugar company found to use forced labor, whose owners include American donors with fundraising ties to Trump, was allowed to resume imports without completing key remediation steps.
A top Bosnian Serb politician sanctioned for corruption was delisted after Trump allies intervened on his behalf. The tracker identifies three worrying trends. First, the Global Magnitsky sanctions program has been largely silenced.
Created in 2017 with bipartisan congressional support, the program lets the U.S. freeze assets and ban visas for corrupt or abusive actors anywhere in the world. The first Trump administration sanctioned 101 targets in the program's first year. Biden's first year saw 173.
The second Trump term has produced just six Magnitsky designations in 16 months. Three of those targeted a Brazilian Supreme Court justice in a widely condemned action that was reversed months later. More Magnitsky sanctions have been lifted than imposed.
A senior Hungarian official and a former Paraguayan president—both sanctioned for corruption and linked to conservative governments friendly to Trump—were delisted with vague justifications. The administration said the sanctions were "inconsistent with U.S. foreign policy interests" or "no longer required to incentivize changes in behavior." Congress was not given the advance notice required by law. These precedents have not gone unnoticed.
Bulgaria briefly joined Trump's "Board of Peace" to try to get a senior politician delisted. South Sudan offered to detain migrants the U.S. wanted to deport to third countries, seeking sanctions relief for a former top official in exchange. Neither gambit has succeeded yet.
But the message was received: this administration appears to be open for business. Second, the administration appears to be rehabilitating corrupt or well-connected figures. A famously corrupt leader from Equatorial Guinea had travel restrictions loosened last fall.
A former Kenyan official claims similar relief. The backdrop includes Trump's pause of Foreign Corrupt Practices Act enforcement and pardons for corruption defendants. Last July, Treasury removed sanctions on eight individuals and companies linked to Myanmar's brutal military junta.
The announcement came shortly after the junta's leader praised Trump and called for sanctions relief. A United Nations expert on human rights in Myanmar condemned the move as "a shocking turn in U.S. policy" and "a major step backward for international efforts to save lives by restricting the murderous junta's access to weapons."
White House officials insisted the delistings did not signal a broader policy shift. One sanctions lawyer said three of the delisted persons were his clients and had provided evidence through the administrative petition process. Treasury declined to say why any of them were removed.
Third, a steady stream of Russia-related sanctions relief has accelerated. Starting late last fall and reaching a weekly drumbeat by March, the administration has been removing sanctions intended to hamper Russia's economy during its war on Ukraine. Some removals have plausible explanations.
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One Russian legislator had died. Others had simply been officials at state-owned companies, a status they may have changed. Some broader relief was ostensibly meant to mitigate economic shocks from the U.S.
Other delistings raise harder questions. A Cypriot financial adviser reported to be a personal fixer for Russian billionaire Alisher Usmanov. Three Malian military officials who allegedly facilitated abuses by Russia's Wagner Group.
A Turkish businessman involved in "enabling Russian intelligence services to procure technology for sanctioned Russian entities." A Hungarian bank executive who has reportedly coordinated with Russian officials to expand Moscow's intelligence presence in Europe. These removals come as Trump's allies claim he is open to increasing pressure on Putin. They also coincide with reports that Russian authorities are working at high levels to secure delistings for their nationals, including coordinating with Hungary to lift EU sanctions on people tied to Usmanov. "In theory, of course, these actors might all have cut ties with Russian authorities or changed their behavior," Keith and Strayer wrote. "Reports about the administration's desire to resume business with Russia at any cost, however, give reason to be more cynical."
Not all delistings are problematic. The administration lifted a wide range of sanctions on Syria after Bashar al-Assad's overthrow in December 2024, heeding calls from human rights defenders. Sanctions relief on Belarus came after the release of political prisoners, a concrete concession.
Sanctions are not meant to be permanent. Targets must be able to challenge the basis for their designation. Conditions change.
Governments make mistakes. The prospect of relief can incentivize behavior change. But the process has been abused before.
During Trump's first term, officials tried to secretly lift sanctions on Dan Gertler, an allegedly corrupt Israeli billionaire operating in the Congo who had mobilized administration allies to lobby on his behalf. Former Trump appointees called the action "shocking…an abuse of the process" and "truly appalling." Biden officials reversed it weeks later. Now the volume and substance of delistings are drawing fresh alarm.
The tracker counts 145 individuals or companies removed from Treasury sanctions as of mid-April, plus a handful of State Department visa bans and Customs import restrictions. That pace greatly exceeds Biden's roughly 200 comparable delistings over four years. Other jurisdictions have not followed Washington's lead.
After Trump canceled a program sanctioning Israeli settlers for violence against Palestinians in the West Bank, the United Kingdom and other governments went further, sanctioning two senior Israeli ministers for inciting such violence. But such gap-filling has been rare. Why It Matters: The hollowing out of U.S. sanctions enforcement dismantles a tool that has altered the behavior of abusive security forces in Bangladesh, stigmatized corrupt businessmen in the Congo, supported anti-corruption activists in Ukraine, and raised the profile of political prisoners in Russia.
When the world's largest economy stops naming and penalizing corrupt actors, the cost of graft drops globally—and the victims are ordinary people in countries where the rule of law is already fragile. Congress needs to do much more oversight, Keith and Strayer argue. Some Democratic senators have objected to specific removals.
But illuminating the broader picture matters as much as individual cases. Lawmakers should ask how many delistings under State Department visa bans have never been publicly reported. Those can be imposed and lifted confidentially.
A future Congress will need to legislate tougher transparency requirements. The Global Magnitsky Act already has some rules, but this administration is ignoring them. The primary law governing U.S. financial sanctions should be amended to require a substantive explanation for any delisting, made public or submitted confidentially to Congress only if necessary for someone's safety.
Future administrations should also state clearly, when imposing a sanction, what behavior change would prompt its removal. Treasury and State rarely do this. Setting clear expectations would incentivize reform and serve as a soft check on any future administration tempted to lift sanctions on dubious grounds.
Key Takeaways: - At least 145 individuals and companies have been removed from Treasury sanctions under Trump, a pace far exceeding Biden's four-year total of roughly 200 comparable delistings. - Delistings have benefited Russia-linked actors, corrupt officials in allied governments, and figures tied to Myanmar's junta, often with no public explanation. - Congress is urged to demand transparency and legislate mandatory public justifications for future sanctions removals. What comes next: Congressional hearings are the immediate pressure point. The longer-term fight is legislative. financial sanctions law to require substantive, public explanations for every delisting would close the opacity loophole that currently lets administrations of either party quietly reward friends and abandon accountability.
Until that happens, the signal the U.S. sends to corrupt actors worldwide is unmistakable: the price of impunity just dropped.
Key Takeaways
— - At least 145 individuals and companies have been removed from Treasury sanctions under Trump, a pace far exceeding Biden's four-year total of roughly 200 comparable delistings.
— - The Global Magnitsky program has been effectively frozen: only six new designations in 16 months, with more sanctions lifted under the program than imposed.
— - Delistings have benefited Russia-linked actors, corrupt officials in allied governments, and figures tied to Myanmar's junta, often with no public explanation.
— - Congress is urged to demand transparency and legislate mandatory public justifications for future sanctions removals.
Source: Just Security
