Péter Magyar's Tisza party secured a decisive victory in Hungary last weekend, ending Viktor Orbán's 16-year tenure as prime minister. The win signals a fundamental shift in the nation's political landscape, particularly regarding media freedom, according to Gábor Polyák, a professor of media law at Eötvös Loránd University in Budapest. Magyar has already begun challenging the state-controlled news outlets, which he called a "factory of lies."
Magyar's first public steps as prime minister-elect included a combative appearance on the state-controlled M1 television network. During the Wednesday interview, he directly confronted anchors, accusing them of spreading falsehoods about his family. He compared the channel's output to propaganda from totalitarian regimes, specifically citing North Korea and Nazi-era Germany.
This direct challenge to the media apparatus that had largely ignored him for the past 18 months marked a stark departure from previous opposition tactics. He made his intentions clear. "We have no personal resentment," Magyar told his interviewer, "but one of the elements of our program is that this factory of lies will be put to an end after the formation of the Tisza government." The promise resonated deeply with many. He emphasized that the goal was not personal retribution but rather to ensure a public media that "reports truthfully" for all Hungarians.
The election result brought starkly different reactions across Hungary. In Budapest, thousands celebrated Magyar’s win, but for citizens like Balasz’s 80-year-old great-grandmother in Hungary’s deprived eastern countryside, the outcome sparked intense fear. Balasz, a 42-year-old financial analyst who spoke to CNN, described her experience.
For the past decade, she consumed little beyond state media. This created an "alternate reality" for her, Balasz explained. Orbán’s Fidesz party, through its controlled outlets, painted Magyar as a reckless warmonger.
They claimed his victory would mean mass conscription for Hungarian men. The economy would collapse. A third world war would surely follow.
These were daily messages. Balasz found it shocking how extreme these "lies" were. He saw parallels to the communist propaganda he remembered from his youth in the Soviet Union. "You’re old, you’re in the countryside, you’re poor, you have, like, two TV channels, you’re listening to state radio," Balasz stated, summarizing the vulnerability to such narratives.
This sense of disorienting reality was not isolated. Professor Gábor Polyák, from Eötvös Loránd University, shared similar observations from the capital. He heard stories of elderly individuals in small villages living in fear following Magyar's victory. "I have heard stories about depressed people who cannot come out from under the bed," Polyák told CNN, describing the psychological impact of a worldview suddenly challenged.
For many, a perceived stable reality had dissolved. Magyar himself had anticipated this. He previously likened his victory to the disorienting conclusion of "The Truman Show," the 1998 film about a man unaware his life is a reality TV program.
Voters might experience "cognitive dissonance," he warned, as their long-held perceptions came apart. He cautioned that beliefs "won’t change overnight."
Orbán's sophisticated media apparatus did not materialize overnight. It developed over his 16 years in power, becoming a crucial tool in his four consecutive election victories. His journey back to power, after an unexpected loss in 2002, shaped his approach.
Orbán had first become prime minister in 1998, leading Hungary into NATO and steering it towards European Union membership. However, voters ousted him four years later. That crushing defeat taught him a lesson, a person close to Orbán told CNN: "going back to opposition is not a very good idea anymore." He returned to office in 2010.
Upon his return, Orbán moved quickly to consolidate control. His Fidesz government secured a two-thirds majority in parliament. This allowed them to amend Hungary’s constitution at will.
In 2013, a series of measures limited pre-election political advertising primarily to broadcasters. Most of these broadcasters had already come under the influence of Orbán's allies. He also installed a Fidesz loyalist to lead the national Media Authority.
These legal and regulatory changes laid the groundwork. The financial mechanisms, however, proved even more effective in shaping the media landscape. Szabolcs Panyi, an investigative reporter who began his career as these changes gained momentum, highlighted the "business side" as the most impactful.
State-owned banks offered "cheap or even free loans" to Orbán's associates. These funds were used to acquire media outlets. The new owners either shut down these outlets or transformed them into mouthpieces for Fidesz.
The strategy aimed to "filter out any negative news regarding the Orbán government," Panyi explained to CNN. This was a clear directive. Advertising revenue became another lever of control.
The Hungarian state, traditionally the largest advertiser in the country's media market, began redirecting its ad spending. Outlets deemed critical of Fidesz saw their state advertising disappear. Klubradio, a popular radio station, became an early target.
After the national lottery pulled its advertisements, private companies quickly followed suit. The station lost its right to nationwide broadcasting. It eventually went off air in 2021.
The financial pressure was immense. Origo, founded in 1998 and once one of Hungary’s most-read news websites, faced similar pressures. András Pethő, a former reporter for Origo, recounted the internal shifts.
He observed the CEO putting pressure on the editor to soften certain stories. The CEO aimed to maintain favor with the government. A critical moment arrived in 2014 when Pethő broke a story about the lavish expenses of an Orbán government minister.
The CEO wanted the editor to kill the story, Pethő claimed. The reason, he said, was "not because it was factually inaccurate – the problem was that it was true." The editor resigned months later. "It’s not a normal situation where you lose your job because you did it well," Pethő reflected. He subsequently left Origo to co-found Direkt36, one of the few independent outlets that have continued to operate under significant government pressure for the past decade.
Reporters at independent outlets faced direct targeting. Szabolcs Panyi, who also writes for Direkt36, contributed to an investigation just before the recent election. This report uncovered secret communications between Hungarian and Russian foreign ministers.
The findings caused considerable embarrassment for Fidesz. The government responded by ordering an investigation into Panyi. They alleged his journalism was merely "cover" for spying. "I never thought it would end up like that, where I would be accused of spying by the prime minister," Panyi stated.
This was a direct attack on press freedom. The Fidesz propaganda machine systematically vilified perceived "enemies" over 16 years. Targets ranged from liberal philanthropist George Soros to, more recently, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky. "When you only consume this news, you don’t have an opportunity for a reality check – it is your reality," Panyi noted.
He explained that one cannot blame an 80-year-old grandmother for her views, because "that’s what she sees of the world through her TV and her newspapers." The tragedy, Panyi added, was that "the propaganda became normalized." Many simply grew accustomed to it. Former US Ambassador to Hungary, David Pressman, confirmed the dual nature of this system. He stepped down last year.
Pressman himself was frequently attacked on state media, depicted as an "LGBTQ activist." He stated that "Orbán used a sophisticated, taxpayer-funded propaganda operation built on fear." The public, he argued, indirectly funded the very messages designed to mislead them. "He focused public attention on things that don’t exist in order to distract from things that do." This was the core strategy. For years, this strategy proved effective. Fidesz propaganda was difficult to escape.
Rural Hungary was covered for weeks with posters warning about Magyar and Zelensky. Political bulletins often aired during soccer match half-times on state media. This pervasive environment made Magyar’s breakthrough a "surprise," according to Ambassador Pressman.
Orbán’s campaign dominated airwaves and billboards. Magyar, in contrast, relied on an extensive ground game. He visited 700 towns and villages over two years, he told reporters at his first international press conference on Monday.
His in-person campaign drew large numbers of voters. He reached areas of rural Hungary previously considered "completely written off" as Fidesz strongholds, Pressman observed. This direct engagement circumvented the controlled media.
The victory, despite the propaganda, indicated a shift in public sentiment. Most Hungarians, Gábor Polyák suggested, no longer believed state media narratives. They had grown tired of a stagnant economy and widespread corruption. "The propagandists believed the propaganda more than the target groups," Polyák concluded.
This disconnect proved critical. The election demonstrated that even a highly controlled information environment can be overcome by persistent, direct engagement. What this actually means for your family is a future where the news you consume might reflect a broader range of perspectives.
For years, the official narrative shaped daily life, influencing everything from economic expectations to fears about international conflicts. When public media functions as a government mouthpiece, it limits the information available for informed decisions, whether about healthcare, education, or local governance. The promise of a more truthful media environment could mean a stronger foundation for civic participation.
It could mean more transparency in government. The policy says one thing: that public media should serve the public interest. The reality says another: that it became a powerful tool for a single political party.
Magyar's government faces the challenge of aligning policy with reality. Dismantling Orbán's media "machine" will take time. With its own two-thirds parliamentary majority, Tisza can reverse the constitutional changes Fidesz introduced, Polyák noted.
Magyar could establish a new media regulatory body. He could reshape state television and radio. These are crucial first steps.
However, the real challenge will come from private companies. Orbán’s allies accumulated significant wealth from public funds, Polyák pointed out. They could continue to lavishly finance pro-Fidesz outlets if they choose.
This presents a complex hurdle. The financial muscle behind the old guard remains substantial. For many Hungarian reporters, the week following the election felt like a fresh dawn.
They recalled attending Fidesz news conferences but rarely being called upon to ask questions. In stark contrast, Magyar thanked the Hungarian media for their patience during his Monday press conference. He then answered questions for three hours.
This openness was a tangible change. Szabolcs Panyi, however, tempered expectations. He did not foresee this "honeymoon" period lasting indefinitely.
He expressed hope that the new government would allow Hungary's media to heal "organically." This would enable journalists to fulfill their role of "holding whoever is in power to account." When Magyar takes office next month, this will mean scrutinizing his untested government of inexperienced ministers. Panyi described the situation with a television metaphor: "To me, it feels like Season One has ended. I’m pretty sure that Season Two is starting soon." The story continues.
Why It Matters: This shift in Hungary carries significant implications beyond its borders. It serves as a real-world example of how a deeply entrenched disinformation system can be challenged and, at least partially, overcome. For democracies globally grappling with state-sponsored propaganda and the erosion of trust in media, Hungary’s experience offers both warnings and potential pathways forward.
It underscores the critical role of independent journalism and direct citizen engagement in maintaining a vibrant public discourse. The outcome will influence perceptions of democratic resilience within the European Union. Key Takeaways: - Péter Magyar's Tisza party defeated Viktor Orbán's Fidesz, ending 16 years of rule. - Orbán built a "propaganda machine" through legal changes, financial leverage, and targeting critical outlets. - Magyar's in-person campaign, visiting 700 towns, circumvented state-controlled media. - The new government faces the challenge of dismantling this system and fostering independent journalism.
What comes next: Magyar's government will take office next month. Observers will watch closely for concrete steps to reform state media and establish a new regulatory framework. The financial power of Orbán's allies in funding private pro-Fidesz outlets remains a significant obstacle.
The long-term healing of Hungary's media landscape will depend on sustained efforts to ensure transparency and accountability.
Key Takeaways
— - Péter Magyar's Tisza party defeated Viktor Orbán's Fidesz, ending 16 years of rule.
— - Orbán built a "propaganda machine" through legal changes, financial leverage, and targeting critical outlets.
— - Magyar's in-person campaign, visiting 700 towns, circumvented state-controlled media.
— - The new government faces the challenge of dismantling this system and fostering independent journalism.
Source: CNN
